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COMMENTS
WHICH WAY TO THE RIGHT COURT? THE USE OF
FEDERAL TRANSFER STATUTES WHEN A COURT IS A
PROPER VENUE BUT LACKS PERSONAL JURISDICTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff has been injured in an automobile collision with de-
fendant. Defendant resides in another state. His only contact with
plaintiff's state was his trip which resulted in the collision with
plaintiff.' Plaintiff files suit in a federal district court of his state
seeking more than $50,000 in damages. This court has subject mat-
ter jurisdiction over this action based on diversity of citizenship.' In
addition, venue is proper in the district where plaintiff resides.' Per-
sonal jurisdiction, however, will be lacking if the defendant is not
within the state4 or otherwise subject to the court's jurisdiction by his
having established minimum contacts with the plaintiff's state.'
If personal jurisdiction were lacking, the court would be con-
0 1990 by Bradford Nilsson.
1. This situation is modeled after the hypothetical suggested by Justice Harlan in his
dissent in Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 468 n.1 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1989). The relevant portion of this statute reads: "(a) The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in contro-
versy exceeds the sum or value of $50,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between...
(1) citizens of different States .... " Id.
3. Id. § 1391(a) (1982). This subsection reads: "(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is
founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought
only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim
arose." Id.
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f). The relevant portion of this rule provides: "All process other
than a subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the
district court is held . I..." d.
5. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). For background on
the development of the doctrine of minimum contacts, see generally 4 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER
& E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CIVIL 2D § 1069 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp.
1988).
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fronted with a decision to either dismiss the case or transfer it to a
proper court. If it would unduly prejudice plaintiff's rights to dismiss
the action, a court could transfer the action to a proper district. A
transfer would be appropriate, for instance, if a subsequent filing of
the action would be barred by the applicable statute of limitations. A
court, however, would face a "nearly hopeless muddle of conflicting
reasoning and precedent"' in deciding which federal transfer statute
should be used when a court is a proper venue but lacks personal
jurisdiction.7
On its face, section 1404(a) of Title 28 of the United States
Code8 seems to require both venue and personal jurisdiction.' In
contrast, section 1406(a) appears to address instances when venue is
improper."0 Neither statute appears to deal with the situation where
a court is a proper venue but lacks personal jurisdiction." The
courts, however, have interpreted both these statutes in order to side-
step the problem. Some courts read section 1404(a) to not require
personal jurisdiction 2; other courts interpret section 1406(a) to ap-
ply when venue is proper.18 Still other courts find an inherent power
to transfer actions in such instances by reading both statutes to-
gether,14 and some courts state that a transfer may be ordered by
6. Ellis v. Great S.W. Corp., 646 F.2d 1099, 1106 (5th Cir. 1981).
7. Although the decision on which statute to use may be difficult, one court has noted
that the method used is of little concern to the participants in a lawsuit. Carty v. Health-Chem
Corp., 567 F. Supp. 1, 2 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
8. All code sections referred to in the text of this comment are taken from Title 28 of the
United States Code unless otherwise indicated.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) reads: "For the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division
where it might have been brought." Many treatises indicate that this provision codifies or is
modeled on the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens which requires both personal
jurisdiction and venue. See, e.g., F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.11 (1985);
J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.17 (1985). For the juris-
dictional and venue requirements of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, see generally 15 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, JURISDICTION 2D § 3828 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1988).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) reads: "The district court of a district in which is filed [a] case
laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice,
transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought." Several
treatises affirm that section 1406(a) is only applicable when venue is improper. See, e.g., F.
JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 9, § 2.11; C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 257
(1983).
11. See Liaw Su Teng v. Skaarup Shipping Corp., 743 F.2d 1140, 1147 (5th Cir.
1984). The court cynically noted: "Sections 1404(a) and 1406(a) are both short, apparently
clear, and seemingly mutually exclusive . . . .Yet, in law, as several poets have observed
about life, things are not always what they seem." Id.
12. See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 105-13 and accompanying text.
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using either statute.1" Finally, growing academic and judicial senti-
ment calls for the use of a recently enacted statute, section 1631 of
Title 28 of the United States Code, which on its face applies to the
instance where a court is a proper venue but lacks personal
jurisdiction. 6
Section II of this comment will first discuss the methods which
courts have used to transfer actions when courts lack personal juris-
diction but venue is proper. The three federal transfer statutes, their
legislative histories, and the courts' differing interpretations of venue
and jurisdictional requirements will be explored. This comment will
survey how courts have construed and molded each statute, or the
two statutes together, to fit situations in which a court is a proper
venue but lacks personal jurisdiction.
Section III of this comment will describe the problem which
arises from the current methods of judicial construction, and Section
IV will analyze each of these constructions. The Supreme Court, in
its Goldlawr decision, established the goal that each case should be
decided on its merits and that the technicalities of venue and jurisdic-
tion should not overwhelm the interests of justice. 7 This comment
will suggest that each solution facilitates these goals but in an overly
difficult and complicated manner.
Finally, Section V of this comment will propose a new "catch
all" federal transfer statute. This statute will ensure that each case is
resolved on its merits and that the interests of justice are not stymied.
In addition, this new statute will clarify the process of transferring
actions between improper and proper courts.
II. BACKGROUND
This section will first explore the evolution which gave rise to
the codification of the federal venue statutes sections 1404(a),
1406(a), and 1631 of Title 28 of the United States Code. This sec-
tion will follow the legislative history of each statute, will detail each
statute's personal jurisdiction and venue requirements, and will de-
scribe how each statute has been applied to transfer actions when a
court lacks personal jurisdiction but venue is properly laid.
A. The Development of Federal Transfers
Prior to 1948, the federal courts had no method to transfer ac-
15. See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
17. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 (1962).
1990]
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tions which were brought in improper or inconvenient forums."8
Dismissal was the only option. In 1947, in the leading case of Gulf
Oil Co. v. Gilbert,19 the Supreme Court generally adopted the com-
mon law doctrine of forum non conveniens for the federal court sys-
tem." Long at use in the state courts, this doctrine allows a compe-
tent court to dismiss an action when the action could have been
brought in a more convenient court. 1 A court can employ the' doc-
trine of forum non conveniens to alleviate undue harassment of a
defendant in a proper but inconvenient venue. To invoke this doc-
trine, the court needs personal jurisdiction over the defendant and
venue must be proper.2
In Gilbert, the plaintiff Gilbert, a resident of Virginia, brought
an action in a New York district court for fire damage to property
located in Virginia. Gulf, the defendant, was incorporated in Penn-
sylvania and had sufficient contacts with New York to allow the
court to assert personal jurisdiction over it. Venue was properly laid
in the district under a New York statute. Following New York pre-
cedent, the district court dismissed the case on the basis that the fo-
rum was inconvenient to the defendant. Finding that the New York
precedent did not control, the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit reversed and held that no basis existed for dismissal. Finally, the
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and upheld the New
York district court's dismissal. The Court noted that New York had
no connection with the action, though personal jurisdiction and
venue requirements had been met. By endorsing the doctrine of fo-
18. State courts had earlier developed methods for transferring cases intrastate. See, e.g.,
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 398 (West 1973 & Supp. 1988) (originally enacted in 1872); N.Y.
CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 510 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1988) (based on 1848 Field Code).
19. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
20. See generally 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 9, § 3828.
Earlier, the doctrine of forum non conveniens had been endorsed by the Supreme Court in one
limited circumstance. See Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1933). The Rogers
Court recognized that a court could decline jurisdiction in order that an out of state federal
court would not involve itself in "suits relating to the conduct of internal affairs of foreign
corporations." Id. at 131. See also Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Co., 153 F.2d 883, 884 (2d Cir. 1946).
The doctrine of forum non conveniens "has a recognized ambit in both federal and local law to
prevent exercise abroad of supervision over the 'internal affairs' of a corporation." Id.
21. See Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 380
(1947) for the development and use of forum non conveniens in state courts. See also Blair,
The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1929). See also Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens: A Doctrine in Search of a Role, 74 CALIF.
L. REV 1259 (1986) (suggesting that the doctrine of forum non conveniens be abolished).
22. Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504 (1947). The Court stated that "[tihe
doctrine of forum non conveniens can never apply if there is an absence of jurisdiction or a
mistake of venue." Id.
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rum non conveniens, the Supreme Court left the plaintiff free to re-
file the suit in Virginia and extricated the defendant from an incon-
venient forum. The Supreme Court did not address the issue of
prejudice to the plaintiff's rights. Subsequently, the plaintiff was
able to refile the action.
In 1948, under the influence of the Gilbert decision, Congress
acted to authorize dismissal or interstate transfer between the federal
courts when either route served the interest of justice. Congress en-
acted both section 1404(a) and section 1406(a) in order to bring
about this goal.
B. 28 U.S.C. Section 1404
1. The Statute and Legislative History
Section 1404 was enacted to replace the doctrine of forum non
conveniens in the federal courts.23 Subsection (a) reads:
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought.2 '
The legislative history of this section is not particularly illuminat-
ing. 5 According to the Revisor's Notes, section 1404(a) "was drafted
in accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens, permitting
transfer to a more convenient forum, even though the venue is
proper."'
Judicial decisions, however, have recognized that section 1404
is broader than the doctrine of forum non conveniens.217 The lan-
guage of the statute allows for transfer as well as dismissal for cases
brought in inconvenient forums. In addition, section 1404(a) uses
different criteria than forum non conveniens to determine whether
23. See generally 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.- COOPER, supra note 9, § 3841;
Annotation, Construction and Application of Change of Venue or Transfer Provision ofJudi-
cial Code (28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)), Apart from Questions of Convenience and Justice of Trans-
fer, 7 A.L.R. FED. 9 (1971).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982).
25. See H.R. REP. No 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A-132 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 2646,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. A-127 (1946). See also Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1949) (discussing
the early legislative history of 1404(a)).
26. H.R. REP. No 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A-132 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 2646, 79th
Cong., 2nd Sess. A-127 (1946).
27. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 264 (1981). The Court found
that "Congress enacted § 1404(a) to permit change of venue between federal courts. Although
the statute was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens ...it was
intended to be a revision rather than a codification of the common law." Id.
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the transfer or dismissal should be granted. The doctrine of forum
non conveniens necessitates that the court consider its "contacts"
with the pending action; section 1404(a) requires only that the court
consider the convenience of the parties and witnesses and the inter-
ests of justice."
Courts uniformly have stated that a lesser showing of inconve-
nience is required for section 1404 than that required by the doctrine
of forum non conveniens.29 And, unlike the forum non conveniens
doctrine, section 1404(a) applies to all civil actions before a federal
court.30
2. Case Law Interpretations of Jurisdictional Requirements
for Section 1404(a)
Courts have not yet reached a consensus on whether section
1404(a) requires personal jurisdiction. A majority of courts have
held that personal jurisdiction is not a prerequisite to invoking sec-
tion 1404.81 These courts have ruled that the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman," which held that transfers under
section 1406(a) do not require personal jurisdiction, applies equally
to transfers under section 1404(a)."8
This view is given strength by the Court's disposition of a com-
panion case to Goldlawr. Hohensee v. News Syndicate, Inc.8 con-
cerned the transfer of a case when venue was proper but personal
jurisdiction over the defendant was lacking. This case was "re-
28. See Kaufman, Observations on Transfers under Section 1404(a) of the New Judi-
cial Code, 10 F.R.D. 595, 598 (1951).
29. See, e.g., Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955). The Court observed:
When Congress adopted § 1404(a) it intended to do more than codify the ex-
isting law on forum non conveniens. . . .Congress, in writing § 1404(a), which
was an entirely new section, was revising as well as codifying. . . .[Wie believe
that Congress ... intended to permit courts to grant transfers upon a lesser
showing of inconvenience.
Id.
30. See Kaufman, supra note 28, at 598.
31. See, e.g., Matra Et Manurhin v. International Armament Co., 628 F. Supp. 1532
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 821 (1964); Internatio-Rotterdam, Inc. v. Thomsen, 218 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1955); Koch-
ring Co. v. Hyde Constr. Co., 324 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1963); Stewart Coach Indus., Inc. v.
Moore, 512 F. Supp. 879 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Semro v. Halstead Enter., Inc., 619 F. Supp. 682
(N.D. 11. 1985); Kaiser v. Mayo Clinic, 383 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1966); Welsh v. Cunard
Lines, 595 F. Supp. 844 (D. Ariz. 1984).
32. 369 U.S. 463 (1962).
33. See, e.g., Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358 (3d Cir. 1964).
34. 369 U.S. 659 (1962).
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manded for consideration in light of Goldlawr ....""
A minority of courts have ruled that personal jurisdiction is nec-
essary to invoke section 1404(a)." These courts base their reasoning
on the view that section 1404 was derived from the doctrine of forum
non conveniens. They determine that section 1404(a), like the forum
non conveniens doctrine, presupposes two forums which have per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant.3 7
3. Case Law Interpretations of Venue Requirements for
Section 1404(a)
Although it is well settled that the transferee court in a section
1404(a) motion must have jurisdiction and venue over the parties, 8
some dispute remains as to whether venue is a requirement for the
transferor court.39
A majority of courts have held that application of section
1404(a) by the transferor court requires that that court be a proper
venue for the action.40 These decisions are based on the view that
section 1404(a) was derived from forum non conveniens which re-
quired that venue be proper,41 and that section 1404(a) is a compan-
ion section to section 1406(a), which was drafted to deal with in-
stances when the transferor court was an improper venue.42
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Silbert v. Nu-Car Carriers, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Mar-
tin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 1980); United States Ry. Equip. Co. v. Port Huron
& D. R. Co., 58 F.R.D. 588, rev'd on other grounds, 495 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1974); Wilson
v. Kansas City S.R. Co., 101 F. Supp. 56 (D. Mo. 1951); Shapiro v. Bonanza Hotel Co., 185
F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1950); Rhea v. Muskogee Gen. Hosp., 454 F. Supp. 40 (E.D. Ok. 1978).
See also Comment, Personal Jurisdiction Requiremnents Under Federal Change of Venue
Statutes, 1962 Wis. L. REv 342, 343 ("[The legislative history of section 1404(a) gives rise to
a simple syllogism. Section 1404(a) embodies the doctrine of forum non conveniens. That doc-
trine could be applied only when the court had personal jurisdiction. Therefore, section
1404(a) can be applied only when the court has personal jurisdiction." Id.).
37. See Annotation, supra note 23, at 40-41.
38. See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960). The transferee court must have per-
sonal jurisdiction and venue at the time the action is commenced, not just at the time the
transfer is requested. Id. at 342.
39. See Annotation, supra note 23, at 35-37.
40. See, e.g., Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 580 F. Supp. 1082 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Junior Spice,
Inc. v. Turbotville Dress, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 1189 (D. Pa. 1972); Blackwell v. Vance Trucking
Co., 139 F. Supp. 103 (D.S.C. 1956); Thornton v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. 397 F.
Supp. 476 (D. Ga. 1975); Mead Corp. v. Oscar J. Boldt Constr. Co, 508 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.
Ohio 1981); Kramer v. Pittstown Point Landings, Ltd. 637 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. 11. 1986);
Wooldridge v. Beech Aircraft Corp, 479 F. Supp. 1041 (W.D. Mo. 1979); United States v. E.
I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 83 F. Supp. 233 (D.D.C. 1949).
41. See, e.g., Blackwell, 139 F. Supp. at 109-10.
42. See, e.g., Matra Et Manurhin, 628 F. Supp. at 1534 n.2.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
In contrast, a minority of courts see a section 1404(a) transfer
as permissible when venue is improper in the transferor court.'
These courts often view a section 1404(a) transfer as based on an
inherent power of the court and not on proper venue."
4. Case Law Applications of Section 1404(a) when the Court
Lacks Personal Jurisdiction but Venue is Proper
In Koehring Co. v. Hyde Construction Co., 5 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals dealt with a Mississippi plaintiff's claim for breach
of contract against a Wisconsin' corporation for work on an
Oklahoma plant. In a Mississippi district court, the defendant al-
leged that the court lacked personal jurisdiction and sought either
dismissal or a transfer to an Oklahoma district court. The court of
appeals overturned the Mississippi district court's denial of the alter-
native motions and ordered a transfer under section 1404(a)." 6
The court did not consider the question of whether personal
jurisdiction existed in this instance but held that section 1404 al-
lowed a transfer when the court lacked personal jurisdiction but
venue was proper."' The court focused on the Goldlawr Court's dis-
cussion of the objectives of section 1406(a). This section was enacted
out of "considerations of convenience and procedural reform," and
these same considerations, the Koehring court found, applied equally
to section 1404(a). 48 Consequently, the court stated, section 1404(a)
should be interpreted broadly and personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendant is not a requirement for invoking the statute.
In 1964, in United States v. Berkowitz,"9 the Third Circuit also
held that section 1404 allowed a transfer when venue was proper but
the court lacked personal jurisdiction. In Berkowitz, the court of ap-
peals considered a denial of a motion for transfer by the United
States in a civil action to collect back taxes from the defendant.
The United States brought the action in Pennsylvania and
served process on the defendant at the Philadelphia address which
43. See, e.g., Asociacion de Pescadores de Vieques, Inc. v. United States, 497 F. Supp.
54 (D.P.R. 1979); Kalter v. Norton, 202 F. Supp. 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Johnson v. B.G.
Coon Constr. Co., 195 F. Supp. 197 (D. Pa. 1960); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati
Milling Mach. Co., 254 F. Supp. 130 (D. Ill. 1966); Hodgdon v. Needharn-Skyles Oil Co.,
556 F. Supp. 75 (D.D.C. 1982).
44. See, e.g., Kalter, 202 F. Supp. at 952; see also Hodgdon, 556 F. Supp. at 75.
45. 324 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1963).
46. Id. at 296.
47. Id. at 298.
48. Id. at 297-98.
49. 328 F.2d 358 (3d Cir. 1964).
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the I.R.S. had in its records. The defendant moved to dismiss, alleg-
ing that he had been a resident of New York for three years and had
abandoned his residence in Pennsylvania. The district court denied
the United States' motion to transfer the action to New York under
section 1404(a). The court noted that while venue was properly laid
in the transferor district, that court lacked personal jurisdiction;
therefore, section 1404(a) was not applicable.
The court of appeals, however, found that the Goldlawr deci-
sion allowing transfers under section 1406(a) when the court lacked
personal jurisdiction "conclusively settled" the question of the re-
quirement for personal jurisdiction for section 1404(a). 50 The court
noted that both statutes were "companion sections, remedial in na-
ture, enacted at the same time, and both dealing with the expeditious
transfer of an action from one district or division to another." 1
C. 28 U.S.C. Section 1406
1. Statute and Legislative History
Section 1406 was enacted along with section 1404 in 1948. Sub-
section (a) of section 1406 provides:
The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying
venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be
in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or
division in which it could have been brought."2
The Revisor's Note to the 1948 enactment states that this subsection
"provides statutory sanction for transfer instead of dismissal, where
venue is improperly laid."5 A 1949 amendment substituted "may"
for "shall" in the original statute. 4 The Senate Report, commenting
on the change, stated:
It is thought that the provision [section 1406(a)] may be subject
to abuse in that the plaintiff might deliberately bring a suit in a
wrong division or district where he could get service on the de-
fendant, and when the question of venue is raised the court is
required to transfer the case to a court where 'it could have
been brought.' However, in the meantime, service has been per-
fected on the defendant in the wrong venue, and it will carry
50. Id. at 361.
51. Id.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1982).
53. H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A-132 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 2646, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. A-127 (1946).
54. S. REP. No. 303, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1253 (1949).
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over into the new (and proper) venue. 55
Again, in a 1960 amendment which added subsection (c) to sec-
tion 1406, the legislative history speaks of the statute as dealing with
an "erroneously chosen venue." 5
2. The Goldlawr Decision: Section 1406 Does Not Require
Personal Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court, in Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, held that
section 1406(a) does not require the court to have personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant in order to transfer the action to a proper
court. 7 In Goldlawr, the plaintiff brought a private antitrust action
against several defendants in Pennsylvania. After the defendants
made motions to dismiss on the basis of lack of personal jurisdiction
and improper venue, the Pennsylvania district court agreed to trans-
fer the action to a New York district court pursuant to section
1406(a), finding that venue was, indeed, improper. The New York
district court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss because the
Pennsylvania court, lacking personal jurisdiction, did not have the
power to transfer the action under section 1406(a).
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the New
York district court decision. The Supreme Court reversed the court
of appeals and noted:
Nothing in that language [of the statute] indicates that the oper-
ation of the section was intended to be limited to actions in
which the transferring court has personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. And we cannot agree [with the court of appeals] that
such a restrictive interpretation [requiring personal jurisdiction]
can be supported by its legislative history .... "
In light of this, the Court observed that "[t]he language of sec-
tion 1406(a) is amply broad enough to authorize the transfer of
cases, however wrong the plaintiff may have been in filing his case
as to venue, whether the court in which it was filed had personal
jurisdiction over the defendant or not." 9 The Court based its deci-
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. S. REP. No. 1894, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1960 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS (86 Stat.) 3583, 3585.
57. Goldlaur, 369 U.S. at 466. See also Comment, Change of Venue in Absence of
Personal Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) and 1406(a), 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 735
(1963).
58. Goldlawr, 369 U.S. at 465-66.
59. Id. at 466. But see S. REP. No. 303, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1253 (1949) (implying
that personal jurisdiction is a requirement).
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sion on a general concern for procedural simplification and a desire
to remove "whatever obstacles may impede an expeditious and or-
derly adjudication of cases and controversies on their, merits. '"60
"[T]ime-consuming and justice-defeating technicalities," the Court
stated, relating to jurisdiction and venue must not overwhelm the
interests of justice.61
3. Does Section 1406(a) Require Improper Venue?
The text of section 1406(a) refers to "laying venue in the
wrong division or district. ' ' "S Many courts and commentators read in
this language its plain meaning and state that a prerequisite for in-
voking section 1406(a) is that venue must be improper.6" Other
courts have argued that, based on a broad reading of the language of
the statute, improper venue is not required.
For example, the Fifth Circuit, in Dubin v United States,"'
gave a broad reading to the language of section 1406(a). In Dubin,
the United States brought a civil action to collect unpaid taxes in an
Ohio district court where the taxpayer had filed his return. Venue
was properly laid, but the court was unable to obtain personal juris-
diction over the defendant because the defendant had moved his resi-
dence to Florida. The court granted the United States' motion to
transfer the action to Florida under section 1406(a) where personal
jurisdiction could be obtained. In the Florida district court, the de-
fendant moved to quash service of process and transfer the action
back to Ohio on the basis that the transfer under section 1406(a) was
inappropriate due to proper venue in Ohio. The Florida district
court denied the defendant's motions.
In upholding the district court's decision, the court of appeals
60. Goldlawr, 369 U.S. at 466-67.
61. Id. at 467 (quoting Internatio-Rotterdam, Inc. v. Thomsen, 218 F.2d 514, 517 (4th
Cir. 1955)).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1982).
63. See, e.g., Heyco, Inc. v. Heyman, 636 F. Supp. 1545, 1547 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Buhl
v. Jeffes, 435 F. Supp. 1149, 1151 (D. Pa. 1977); Wheatly v. Phillips, 228 F. Supp. 439, 442
(W.D.N.C. 1964); Hoffman v. Burroughs Corp., 571 F. Supp. 545, 551 (D. Tex. 1982);
Hayes v. RCA Serv. Co., 546 F. Supp. 661, 665 n.3 (D.D.C. 1982); Kroger Co. v Adkins
Transfer Co., 284 F. Supp. 371 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), aff d, 408 F.2d 813 (1969); Smith v.
Harris, 308 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Johnson v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co., 263 F.
Supp. 278 (W.D. Mo. 1966); Arley v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 379 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 950 (1967). See also 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra
note 9, § 3827, at 263 n.8; Annotation, Construction and Application of Federal Statute (28
USC § 1406) Providing for Dismissal or Transfer Of Cases For Inproper Venue, 3 A.L.R.
FED. 467, 478-89 (1970 & Supp. 1987).
64. 380 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1967).
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felt that the language and legislative intent of section 1406(a) did not
require that venue be improper.65 The court observed that "[t]he
statute does not refer to 'wrong' venue, but rather to venue laid in a
'wrong division or district.' We conclude that a district is 'wrong'
within the meaning of section 1406 whenever there exists an 'obsta-
cle [to] . . . an expeditious and orderly adjudication' on the
merits." 6
The Eighth Circuit expanded upon this reasoning in Mayo
Clinic v. Kaiser.6" In Mayo Clinic, the court of appeals considered
an Illinois district court's transfer pursuant to section 1406(a) to a
Minnesota district court on the plaintiff Kaiser's motion. The plain-
tiff, an Illinois resident, had brought a medical malpractice claim
against the defendant Mayo Clinic, a Minnesota resident. Venue
was proper in the Illinois district court. The defendant moved to
quash service and dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction
in Illinois. The district court granted the motion to quash service and
the motion to transfer to Minnesota. The defendant argued that a
transfer under section 1406(a) was not permissible when venue was
proper.
The court of appeals adopted the Dubin reasoning and held
that section 1406(a) does not require that venue be improper. In ad-
dition, the court observed that "[clertainly a party who has been to-
tally wrong in selecting the forum would have no greater right of
transfer under section 1406(a) than a party who has selected a forum
which is wrong only because service of process cannot be
obtained."68
4. Case Law Applications of Section 1406(a) when the Court
Lacks Personal Jurisdiction but Venue is Proper
A number of courts have viewed a transfer as appropriate under
section 1406(a) when the court lacks jurisdiction but venue is
proper." In Dubin v. United States, the Fifth Circuit held that a
65. Id. at 815 (quoting Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962)). The
court quoted the Goldlawr decision: "The language and history of § 1406(a), both as origi-
nally enacted and as amended in 1949, show a congressional purpose to provide as effective a
remedy as possible to avoid precisely this sort of injustice." Id.
66. Id. (quoting Goldlawr, 369 U.S. at 466).
67. 383 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1967).
68. Id. at 655-56.
69. See, e.g., Taylor v. Love, 415 F.2d 1118 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1023 (1970); Peterson v. U-Haul Co., 421 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969); Manley v. Engram, 755
F.2d 1463, 1467 n.8 (11th Cir. 1985). 1
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transfer was proper under section 1406(a) in such an instance."0 It
based this decision on its finding that the statute's language did not
require venue to be improper.7" Therefore, a court may apply the
holding of Goldlawr to such a situation, when venue is proper and
jurisdiction is lacking, and may use section 1406(a) to transfer a
case.
D. 28 U.S.C. Section 1631
1. The Statute and Legislative History
Section 1631 was enacted by the Federal Courts Improvement
Act of 1982.7 ' The statute reads:
Whenever a civil action is filed in a court as defined in section
610 of this title [28 U.S.C. section 610] or an appeal, including
a petition for review of administrative action, is noticed for or
filed with such a court and the court finds that there is a want
of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice,
transfer such action or appeal to any other such court in which
the action or appeal could have been brought at the time it was
filed or noticed . . .7
The statute provides for transfer between any court defined by
28 U.S.C. section 610. 7" This section includes all district courts, ap-
pellate courts, the United States Claims Court, and the Court of In-
ternational Trade.7 8
The legislative history of section 1631 is brief. The text reads in
part:
70. Dubin v. United States, 380 F.2d 813, 816 (5th Cir. 1967).
71. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
72. The Federal Courts Improvement Act was designed "to improve the quality of our
Federal court system and to enhance citizen access to justice." S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (96 Seat.) 11.
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1982).
74. This is at variance with a literal reading of the legislative intent. The legislative
history states: "This provision is broadly drafted to allow transfer between any two Federal
courts." S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS (96 Stat.) 40 (emphasis added). But 28 U.S.C. section 610 does not cover all
federal courts. Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court is omitted.
75. 28 U.S.C. § 610 (1984). This section reads:
As used in this chapter the word "courts" includes the courts of appeals and the
district courts of the United States, the United States District Court of the Dis-
trict of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, the District Court of the
Virgin Islands, the United States Claims Court, and the Court of International
Trade.
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Because of the complexity of the Federal court system and of
special jurisdiction provisions, a civil case may on occasion be
mistakenly filed in a court-either trial or appellate-that does
not have jurisdiction. By the time the error is discovered, the
statute of limitations or a filing period may have expired. More-
over, additional expense is occasioned by having to file the case
anew in the proper court.
Section 301 [of the Federal Courts Improvement Act] adds a
new chapter to title 28 that would authorize the court in which
a case is improperly filed to transfer it to a court where subject
matter jurisdiction is proper. . . . This provision is broadly
drafted to allow transfer between any two Federal courts.7"
2. Case Law Decisions
Section 1631 allows a federal court which lacks jurisdiction over
any civil action to transfer that action to another federal court in
which jurisdiction is proper." Yet, courts disagree on whether this
statute pertains only to subject matter jurisdiction or to both subject
matter and personal jurisdiction.
Many courts and commentators agree that section 1631 deals
specifically with instances when a court lacks subject matter jurisdic-
tion over a civil action.7' For example, in Nose v. Rementer,7 9 a Del-
aware district court observed that a Maryland district court's order
to transfer a personal injury case to Delaware when it lacked per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant was proper. 0 The Delaware
76. S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS (96 Stat.) 40. See generally Tayon, The Federal Transfer Statute: 28 U.S.C. §
1631, 29 S. TEx. L. REV. 189, 200 (1987).
77. See generally Hempstead County & Nevada County Project v. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, 700 F.2d 459 (8th Cir. 1983), for a proposed three-part test to determine if a
transfer should be allowed under section 1631. The court stated:
First, the court where the action is originally filed must find that there is a want
of jurisdiction; second, the court must determine if [the transfer] is in the inter-
est of justice; and third, that court shall then transfer the action to any such
court in which the action could have been brought at the time it was filed.
Id. at 462. See also Tayon, supra note 76, at 202. In addition, the author notes the court must
consider whether it and the transferee court both fall within the definition of "court" provided
by 28 U.S.C. § 610 (1984). Id.
78. See, e.g., Levy v. Pyramid Co., 687 F. Supp. 48 (N.D.N.Y. 1988); Nose v. Re-
menter, 610 F. Supp. 191 (D. Del. 1985). See generally 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, supra note 9, § 3827. The authors state that this statute "allows transfer if the
federal court in which the suit was brought lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. ... 15 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 9, § 3827, at 262 n.5.
79. 610 F. Supp. 191 (D. Del. 1985).
80. Id. at 192.
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court, nevertheless, found that the Maryland court had been in error
to order the transfer pursuant to section 1631 instead of sec-
tion 1404(a). a" The Delaware court commented that:
Although it is phrased in a manner which could be interpreted
as meaning it is to apply to cases like this one, in which the
transferor court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendants,
section 1631 appears from its legislative history to apply only to
cases in which the transferor court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction.8
This view is strengthened by the fact that the Federal Courts
Improvement Act, while enacting section 1631, repealed 28 U.S.C.
sections 1406(c) and 1584. Section 1406(c) allowed a district court
lacking subject matter jurisdiction over a claim properly before the
former Court of Claims to transfer that action to the Court of
Claims. Similarly, section 1584 allowed a court to transfer a civil
action between the Court of International Trade and the district
courts, courts of appeals, and the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals. Section 1631 superseded sections 1406(c) and 1584 by includ-
ing within its coverage all courts under section 610.83
A few courts, in contrast, have interpreted this provision more
broadly to include personal jurisdiction as well as subject matter ju-
risdiction." In Ross v. Colorado Outward Bound School, Inc.," the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that section 1631 was applica-
ble to transfers for want of personal jurisdiction.
In Ross, the plaintiff filed a civil action for wrongful death in a
New York state court in 1978. The defendant then removed the ac-
tion to a New York federal district court and moved to have the
court dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. In 1985,
more than six years later, the district court recognized that it lacked
personal jurisdiction, and ordered a transfer pursuant to section
1406(a) to a Colorado district court which had personal jurisdiction
over the defendant. The defendant moved for summary judgment,
asserting that Colorado's statute of limitations barred the action. The
81. Id.
82. Id. at 192 n.l.
83. See Tayon, supra note 76, at 192-94.
84. See, e.g., Carty v. Beech Aircraft Co., 679 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir. 1982); Bentz v.
Recile, 778 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1985) (the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a trans-
fer for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to section 1631, but did not reach the issue of its
applicability); Ross v. Colorado Outward Bound School, Inc., 822 F.2d 1524 (10th Cir. 1987);
MMR Holding Corp. v. Sweetser, 675 F. Supp. 326 (M.D. La. 1987).
85. 822 F.2d 1524 (10th Cir. 1987).
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district court granted the motion and held that the action was com-
menced in Colorado on the date of the transfer.86
On the plaintiff's appeal, the court of appeals held that the
transferor court should have used section 1631 since it lacked per-
sonal jurisdiction, and section 1631 provides by its terms that an ac-
tion shall proceed in a transferee court based upon the date it was
filed in the transferor court.87 In doing so, the court noted that sec-
tion 1631 "gave broad authority to permit the transfer of an action
between any two federal courts."88 The court observed that the in-
tent of Congress was that this section should be broadly construed.89
In light of this, the court suggested that section 1631 should be con-
strued to eliminate the tortured interpretations of sections 1404(a)
and 1406(a).90 Further, it concluded that section 1631 was "specifi-
cally designed for cases transferred from one federal court to another
for lack of jurisdiction [and section 1631] served to simplify the pro-
cess and streamline its application."9
Several commentators support this view." These commentators
note that on its face the statute does not restrict itself to subject mat-
ter jurisdiction and that the legislative history does not exclude per-
sonal jurisdiction for the statute's coverage. In addition, they agree
that the purpose behind the Federal Courts Improvement Act was to
simplify and to streamline the federal courts and a broad reading of
section 1631 would best bring this about.
3. Applications of Section 1631 when the Court Lacks
Personal Jurisdiction but Venue is Proper
In Ross v. Colorado Outward Bound School, Inc.," the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a transfer pursuant to section
1631 was required when the transferor court lacked personal juris-
86. Id. at 1525-26.
87. Id. at 1526.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1527.
90. Id. See also Murphy v. Klein Tools, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 982, 986 (1). Kan. 1988).
The Murphy court, following Ross, observed that "[t]his provision [section 1631) eliminates
any further resort to an expansive interpretation of section 1406(a) for purposes of transferring
a case for lack of jurisdiction," and that section 1631 "indicates Congress' intent to limit §
1406(a) to its express terms, that is, a transfer because of improper venue." Id.
91. Ross, 822 F.2d at 1527.
92. See, e.g., Seidelson, The Jurisdictional Reach of a Federal Court Hearing a Fed-
eral Cause of Action: A Path Through the Maze, 23 DuQ. L. REV. 323, 324 n.7,.335 (1985);
Tayon, supra note 76, at 224.
93. 822 F.2d 1524 (10th Cir. 1987).
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diction but venue was proper.9 4 Commenting upon the New York
district court's use of section 1406(a) to transfer the case, the court
noted that:
Although read closely, the language of § 1406(a) appears only
to apply to those cases transferred for lack of proper venue, the
statute has been construed in an extraordinarily broad manner;
courts have held that actions commenced in a district court
where venue is proper but where personal jurisdiction is lacking
may be transferred to a proper forum ...
The enactment on October 1, 1982 of § 1631, specifically
designed for cases transferred from one federal court to another
for lack of jurisdiction, served to simplify the process and
streamline its application.9"
The Ross court thus rejected the expansive interpretations of
section 1406(a)96 and, by implication, section 1404(a), and suggested
that these statutes should be read literally.97 Section 1631, it held,
should be used for all transfers when a court lacks personal
jurisdiction.
In a more ambiguous decision, the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals also used section 1631 to transfer a civil action for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction when venue was proper.99 In Carty v. Beech Air-
craft Corp., the court reversed a district court's decision to deny the
defendants' motions to dismiss two wrongful death actions.99 The
district court noted that it had appropriate subject matter jurisdiction
over the case and that the defendants had "minimum contacts" with
the forum to establish personal jurisdiction.1"' In reversing the dis-
trict court's decision regarding personal jurisdiction, the court of ap-
peals remanded the case and, without comment, noted that section
1631 permitted transfer for want of jurisdiction.1 '
One circuit has left open the question of whether section 1631
applies to transfers for want of personal jurisdiction. In Bentz v.
94. Id. at 1526.
95. Id. at 1527 (citing Mayo Clinic v. Kaiser, 383 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1967); Dubin v.
United States, 380 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1967)).
96. See Murphy v. Klein Tools, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 982, 986 (D. Kan. 1988) ("This
provision [section 1631] eliminates any further resort to an expansive interpretation of
§ 1406(a) for purposes of transferring a case for lack of jurisdiction.").
97. See id. ("This provision [section 16311 also indicates Congress' intent to limit
§ 1406(a) to its express terms, that is, a transfer because of improper venue.").
98. Carty v. Beech Aircraft Co., 679 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir. 1982).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1053.
101. Id. at 1066 & n.17.
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Recile, '0 the Fifth Circuit considered the case of a plaintiff, a resi-
dent of Mississippi, who brought suit in a Mississippi state court to
recover on two promissory notes of several Louisiana residents. The
defendants removed the action to a Mississippi federal district court
and moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district
court found that personal jurisdiction was lacking and transferred
the action to a Louisiana federal district court pursuant to sec-
tion 1631. The Louisiana court granted plaintiff's motion for sum-
mary judgment. In upholding the grant of summary judgment, the
court of appeals noted that section 1631 may not be applicable to
transfers for lack of personal jurisdiction, but specifically reserved
this question."' The court noted that, in any case, such a transfer
would be valid under section 1404(a) or section 1406(a).10'
E. Transfer By Use of Both Section 1404(a) and Section 1406(a)
or Either Section
Some courts have allowed a transfer of a civil action when
venue is properly laid but they lack personal jurisdiction by stating
that the court has an inherent power to order a transfer by reading
both of the statutes together. Other courts have decided, on the other
hand, that either section 1404(a) or section 1406(a) can be used.
In 1977, the court in Volk Co. v. Art-Pak Clip Art Service,"
considered the defendant's alternative motion to either dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue or have the action
transferred pursuant to section 1404(a) or section 1406(a). In order-
ing the transfer, the court declined to consider whether the defendant
was subject to personal jurisdiction or venue was properly laid. The
court noted that it could transfer the action under section 1406(a)
whether or not personal jurisdiction existed over the defendant,"0 6
and under section 1404(a) whether or not venue was proper." 7
Reading both sections together, the court held that the court pos-
sessed an inherent power to transfer the action in the interest of jus-
tice even if personal jurisdiction was lacking and venue was
102. 778 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1985).
103. Id. at 1027.
104. Id.
105. 432 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
106. Id. (following Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962)).
107. The court apparently relied on Kalter v. Norton, 202 F. Supp. 950 (S.D.N.Y.
1962), for the proposition that venue is not required for section 1404(a) transfers. This, how-




The Second Circuit Court of Appeals further developed this
line of reasoning in Corke v. Sameiet M.S. Song of Norway.10 9 In a
diversity action brought in district court, the plaintiff alleged injuries
caused by a shipboard accident and by the shipboard doctor.11 The
lower court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction; the
plaintiff appealed. The court of appeals reversed, stating that a dis-
missal would prejudice the plaintiff's rights since the statute of limi-
tations would bar recovery.
The court accepted the Volk decision in order to sidestep the
paradox required by a literal reading of the statutes and to avoid the
"analytic difficulties" inherent in the Dubin and Berkowitz prece-
dents."' The court suggested that Volk "placed a judicial gloss on
the statutory language, thereby curing Congress' defective drafts-
manship."" 2 This gloss would allow the court to use both statutes to
transfer a civil action, in the interest of justice, when it lacked per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant, whether or not venue was
properly laid in the district."'
Several courts have held that either section 1404(a) or sec-
tion 1406(a) may be used to transfer in such circumstances. The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Aguacate Consolidated Mines,
Inc. v. Deeprock, Inc., "" considered a district court ruling in an ac-
tion for fraud and breach of contract. The lower court dismissed the
suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. On appeal, the court of appeals
noted that the action should be transferred because the action would
now be prohibited by the statute of limitations. The court held that
either section 1404(a) or section 1406(a) could be used to transfer a
case in which the defendant was not subject to personal jurisdiction
in the district in which venue was proper.
In Aguacate, the defendant objected to a district court transfer
under section 1406(a). The defendant argued that venue was proper
and, therefore, section 1406(a) was not appropriate. The court noted
that it had held in Dubin that section 1406(a) did not require that
108. Id. at 1181.
109. 572 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1978).
110. Id. at 78.
111. Id. at 80.
112. Id. at 80 n.9.
113. But see 1.5 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 9, § 3827 (citing
Corke and Volk as supporting the statement that many courts have determined that either
statute can be used).
114. 566 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1978).
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venue be improper."' 5 Moreover, the court observed that this case
could be properly transferred under section 1404(a) following Koeh-
ring which allows a court to transfer an action when it does not have
personal jurisdiction over the defendant."" The court of appeals held
that either statute could be used in this situation and stated that
"transfer of this case would advance the interest of justice and proce-
dural simplification underlying sections 1406(a) and 1404(a).""
III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
For a federal district court to adjudicate a case brought before
it, it must have subject matter jurisdiction, 18 personal jurisdiction,"'
and venue 2 must be properly laid. Subject matter jurisdiction and
personal jurisdiction are constitutional prerequisites for federal court
adjudication. The venue requirement is purely statutory. Jurisdiction
conveys the power to a court to hear an action; venue simply repre-
sents a statutory system to ensure the action is before a convenient
court.
Congress and the courts have labored to provide relief to a
plaintiff who has mistakenly brought his case before the wrong tri-
bunal.. The result, unfortunately, is more of a patchwork than a
system.
Initially, courts were required to dismiss an action when the
court lacked jurisdiction or venue was improper. In response to the
Supreme Court's acceptance of the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. sections 1404(a) and 1406(a). Modeled
after forum non conveniens, section 1404(a) appears to require both
personal jurisdiction and venue. On the other hand, section 1406(a)
on its face requires that venue .be improper; the Supreme Court, in
its Goldlawr decision, clearly stated that section 1406(a) does not
require personal jurisdiction.
In consequence, a court can transfer an action if it has both
115. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
117. Aguacate, 566 F.2d at 524. See also Cot v. Wadel, 796 F.2d 981, 985 (7th Cir.
1986); Roofing & Sheet Metal Servs., Inc. v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 689 F.2d 982, 992
n.16 (11th Cir. 1982); Bayles v. K-Mart, 636 F. Supp. 852, 856 n.4 (D.D.C. 1986); Froelich
v. Petrelli, 472 F. Supp. 756, 759-760 (D. Haw. 1979).
118. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1988) (diversity of citizenship, amount in controversy
more than $50,000); Id. § 1331 (1982) (federal question); Id. § 1333 (admiralty, maritime
and price cases); Id. § 1338 (patents and copyrights). See generally 15 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 9, § 3827.
119. See supra notes 4-5.
120. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1982) (venue generally).
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personal jurisdiction and venue under section 1404(a) or if it lacks
both personal jurisdiction and venue under section 1406(a). A court
can also transfer a case when jurisdiction is proper but venue is in-
correct under section 1406(a). Which statute should a court use
when it lacks personal jurisdiction but venue is proper? Neither
Congress nor the Supreme Court has spoken conclusively on this
issue.
The lower federal courts, however, have actively tried to resolve
this question. Some courts interpret section 1404(a) to not require
personal jurisdiction; others read section 1406(a) to not require that
venue be improper. Some courts suggest that both statutes read to-
gether will allow a transfer; others state that either statute may be
used. Still other courts read 28 U.S.C. section 1631 to cover this
situation.
IV. ANALYSIS
This section will consider and discuss the merits of the methods
courts have used to transfer actions when they lack personal jurisdic-
tion but venue is proper. Each method will be analyzed to consider
whether it can be supported by the language of the statute, by legis-
lative history, or by the Supreme Court's Goldlawr decision.
A. Transfers Under Section 1404(a)
Congress intended section 1404(a) to replace the doctrine of fo-
rum non conveniens in the federal court system and modeled the new
section after this doctrine."' 1 The doctrine of forum non conveniens
requires that the court have personal jurisdiction over the defendant
and that the court be a proper venue.122 Most courts, however, have
construed section 1404(a) in a more expansive manner than the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens.'2 8 Indeed, many courts have held that
personal jurisdiction is not a prerequisite for invoking
section 1404(a). 24
Several circuit courts of appeal have held that section 1404(a)
is applicable to transfer an action over which a court lacks personal
jurisdiction but in which venue is proper.12 5 In Koehring Co. v.
121. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text. See also Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d
469, 474 (6th Cir. 1980).
122. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
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Hyde Construction Co.,"" the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
stressed the Supreme Court's goals in construing section 1406(a) in
the Goldlawr decision.12 The court found that "[t]he same consider-
ations of convenience and procedural reform which prompted the en-
actment of section 1406(a) apply to section 1404(a), and there is no
basis for distinguishing between them insofar as the rule enunciated
in Goldlawr is concerned. ' 128 In consequence, the court held that
personal jurisdiction is not a requirement for a section 1404(a)
transfer.
In adopting this precedent, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit added to the Koehring court's reasoning. In United States v.
Berkowitz, 9 the court of appeals found that the Supreme Court's
decision in Goldlawr "conclusively settled" the question of the re-
quirement for personal jurisdiction for section 1404(a). 3 ' The court
stated that the Goldlawr decision applied equally to section 1404(a),
observing that sections 1404(a) and 1406(a) were "companion sec-
tions, remedial in nature, enacted at the same time, and both dealing
with the expeditious transfer of an action from one district to
another."''
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has stated that
not requiring personal jurisdiction for section 1404(a) "necessitates
an overly simplified construction of the provision."' 32 This court ob-
served that "[sjection 1404(a) does not seem to provide for such a
transfer [when the court lacks personal jurisdiction] in that sec-
tion 1404(a), to the extent it is comparable to the doctrine of forum
non conveniens, presumes the existence of two possible forums."' 3
The view of the Sixth Circuit may be unnecessarily rigid. The
Revisor's Notes to section 1404(a) state that this section "was
drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
permitting transfer to a more convenient forum, even though the
126. 324 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1963).
127. Id. at 297-98.
128. Id.
129. 328 F.2d 358 (3d Cir. 1964).
130. Id. at 361.
131. Id. See generally 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 9, § 3827,
at 265. (The authors, after observing that a number of courts have allowed transfers pursuant
to section 1406(a), state that "the correct way" to transfer the action under section 1404(a) is
to apply the Goldlawr decision.).
132. Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 1980).
133. Id. The court also recognized the analytical difficulties in construing sec-
tion 1406(a) to apply to instances when venue is correct, but felt bound to follow the earlier
Sixth Circuit precedent of Taylor v. Love, 415 F.2d 1118 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1023 (1970). Martin, 623 F.2d at 474.
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venue is proper.' ' 184  Most courts agree that section 1404(a) is
broader than the doctrine it was meant to replace. 8' Although the
language of the legislative history suggests that section 1404(a) has
the same requirements for personal jurisdiction and venue as the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, courts have made a strong argu-
ment that the language of the statute may be read more flexibly than
this doctrine.
B. Transfers Under Section 1406(a)
The legislative history to the enactment of section 1406(a) and
its amendments is unambiguous on one point: section 1406(a) ap-
plies "where venue is improperly laid."'3 6 A majority of courts take
the language at its plain meaning and state that improper venue is a
prerequisite to invoking section 1406(a). 37 A substantial minority of
courts assert that the language of section 1406(a) must be read in a
broader manner. 8'
In Dubin v United States, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
developed a broad reading of the language of section 1406(a).' 89 The
court reviewed the legislative history of section 1406(a) 4 ° and held
that "a district is 'wrong' within the meaning of § 1406 whenever
there exists an 'obstacle [to] . . . an expeditious and orderly adjudi-
cation' on the merits.'
4
'
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals followed and amplified
134. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. In Dubin, 380 F.2d 813 (5th Cir.
1967), the Government brought a civil action to collect unpaid taxes and penalties in an Ohio
district in which the taxpayer had filed his return. Venue was properly laid, but the district
court was unable to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant because the defendant had
moved his residence to Florida. The court granted the motion of the United States to transfer
the action to Florida under section 1406(a) where personal jurisdiction could be obtained. The
defendant moved to quash service of process and transfer the action back to Ohio on the basis
that the transfer under section 1406(a) was inappropriate due to proper venue in the district
court in Ohio. The court of appeals upheld the district court's denial of the defendant's motion.
The court of appeals noted that dismissal in such an instance could result in a the plaintiffs
case being barred by the statute of limitations merely because the plaintiff had made an erro-
neous judgment as to which court would have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
140. The Dubin court stated that "[t]he language and history of § 1406(a), both as
originally enacted and as amended in 1949, show a congressional purpose to provide as effec-
tive a remedy as possible to avoid precisely this sort of injustice." Dubin, 380 F.2d at 815
(quoting Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962)).
141. Id. (quoting Goldlawr, 369 U.S. at 466).
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this view in Mayo Clinic v. Kaiser."' The court felt that "[c]ertainly
a party who has been totally wrong in selecting the forum would
have no greater right of transfer under § 1406(a) than a party who
has selected a forum which is wrong only because service of process
cannot be obtained."
314
This broad reading of section 1406(a) to include instances
when venue is proper has been criticized for its "tortuous" reason-
ing." 4 The statute is explicit in its reference to venue laid "in the
wrong division or district. '' "4 The Dubin court's suggestion that this
reading is supported by the legislative history of section 1406(a)
when illuminated by the Supreme Court's decision in Goldlawr is
unworkable. The legislative history explicitly states that sec-
tion 1406(a) applies when the transferor court is an improper
venue.14" And although the Goldlawr Court was concerned with re-
moving obstacles to the advancement of the interests of justice, these
interests should not overcome the plain language of the statute.
In addition, the Dubin court's view that venue is "wrong" in a
district or division because the court could not obtain personal juris-
diction over a defendant obscures the clear and considerable distinc-
tion between venue and personal jurisdiction."" Undoubtedly, the
142. 383 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1967).
143. Id. at 655-56.
144. See Shong Ching Lau v. Change, 415 F. Supp. 627, 632 (E.D. Pa. 1976). The
court remarked that "it appears to this Court that to transfer a case under § 1406(a), notwith-
standing the fact that venue is properly laid in the transferor court's division or district, would
necessitate a construction of that section which can only be described as tortuous." Id. at 632
n.9. See also Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 1980). In transferring an action
under section 1406(a), the court admitted that "reliance on § 1406(a) necessitates an overly
broad interpretation." Id. at 474.
But see 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 9, § 3827, at 264. The
authors state that the reasoning that allows transfers under section 1406(a) when a court lacks
jurisdiction but venue is proper is "entirely sound." They state that "[ijf, as Goldlawr holds,
transfer can be ordered of a case from a district where both venue and personal jurisdiction are
lacking, it should follow a fortiori that there can be a transfer if venue is proper and only
personal jurisdiction is lacking." 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 9, §
3827, at 264-65. Earlier, however, the authors state that "[a] prerequisite to invoking
§ 1406(a) is that venue must be improper." 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra
note 9, § 3827, at 263. The authors note that "the correct way to achieve this result [transfer
when the court lacks personal jurisdiction but venue is proper] is to apply the Goldlawr princi-
ple by analogy to transfers under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) . 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER
& E. COOPER, supra note 9, § 3827, at 265.
145. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1982).
146. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
147. See 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 9, § 3827. See also
Corke v. Sameiet M.S. Song of Norway, 572 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1978). The Corke court
summarized the reasoning of the Dubin court as follows: "[Ejven though venue was proper in
Dubin ...it was laid in a 'wrong division or district' because the plaintiff could not obtain
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"wrong" venue referred to in the statute means a court that is not an
appropriate venue under any applicable venue statute.
These criticisms are certainly correct. The legislative history of
section 1406(a), from its enactment in 1948 to its 1960 amend-
ment, 48 makes clear that a prerequisite to invoking the section is
that venue be improper in the transferor court.
C. Transfers Under Both Section 1404(a) and Section 1406(a)
or Either Section
The District Court for the Southern District of New York, in
Volk Co. v. Art-Pak Clip Art Service,' 9 developed the view that
both section 1404(a) and section 1406(a) could be read together to
allow a transfer by a court which lacks personal jurisdiction, but in
which venue is properly laid. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
in Corke v. Sameiet M.S. Song of Norway,'50 adopted and further
amplified this view. The court recognized that the Volk reading
avoided the difficulties required by a literal reading of sec-
tion 1404(a) and section 1406(a). 5 ' The Corke court found that the
Volk court had placed a "judicial gloss" on the language of the two
transfer statutes. This interpretation would give a court the power to
transfer an action using both statutes whether or not a court had
personal jurisdiction and whether or not venue was properly laid in
the division or district.
52
This view has strength because it escapes the necessity of overly
personal jurisdiction over the defendant." Id. at 79; Contra Ellis v. Great S.W. Corp., 646
F.2d 1099, 1106 n.7 (5th Cir. 1981). The Ellis court supported the Dubin reasoning by
suggesting:
[Tihe Dubin rationale does not "blur" concepts of venue and personal jurisdic-
tion, but merely reads § 1406(a) to authorize a change of venue for reasons
other than an absence of authorization for venue in a particular district. Thus,
"venue" would not be wrong because of an inability to obtain personal jurisdic-
tion, but rather the district would be "wrong" for that reason; under the Dubin
rationale, a change of venue under § 1406(a) is proper whenever a district is
"wrong" in this sense, even if the relevant venue statutes, by themselves, would
make the transferor district an appropriate venue.
Id.
But see 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 9, § 3827, at 267 n.16
(The authors argue that the Ellis counter-argument "is difficult to reconcile with the language
of the statute. It is impossible to reconcile it with the statement in the Revisor's Note that
§ 1406(a) applies 'where venue is improperly laid.' ").
148. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
149. 432 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
150. 572 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1978).
151. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
152. Volk, 432 F. Supp. at 1181; Corke, 572 F.2d at 80.
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broad interpretations of section 1404(a) and section 1406(a). The
legislative intent behind the two transfer statutes and the Goldlawr
case provide a clear indication that issues of venue and personal ju-
risdiction should not overwhelm the interests of justice. Several
courts have tried to apply this concern to the individual statutes; and,
in doing so, they have stretched the language of those statutes beyond
what they might reasonably bear. But by reading the two statutes
together and adding a judicial gloss, a court can avoid the analytical
problems inherent in the Berkowitz and Dubin precedents. This
method, however, requires a court to base a transfer not on any spe-
cific statutory authority, but rather on an inherent power of the
court. This lack of specific statutory authority could lead to different
standards and unequal application of the rule by different courts.
D. Transfers Under Section 1631
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held, in Ross v. Colorado
Outward Bound School, Inc., that section 1631 is applicable to
transfer an action when a court lacks personal jurisdiction but venue
is proper.1"8 This court noted that, on its face, section 1631 applies
to such situations and the general legislative history behind its enact-
ment supports this reading.
This section, however, has been used largely by courts to trans-
fer cases over which they lack subject matter jurisdiction. Further,
some courts state that section 1631 applies only to subject matter
jurisdiction. 5 They cite the legislative history of the section which
mentions only subject matter jurisdiction. 55
Certainly, on its face section 1631 could be read to apply to
situations where personal jurisdiction is lacking but venue is prop-
erly laid. It is unclear whether by mentioning only subject matter
jurisdiction Congress intended to specifically exclude personal juris-
diction or whether Congress only wished to make clear that this new
provision also dealt with subject matter jurisdiction. The legislative
history contains language which supports both views.1"'
153. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. See also 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER &
E. COOPER, supra note 9, § 3827, at 262. The authors state that the "suggestion ... that the
1982 statute [section 1631] may have something to do with venue or personal jurisdiction...
flies in the face of the language and the legislative history of the statute." 15 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 9, § 3827, at 262 n.5.




A. Background to the Proposal
The Supreme Court stated the goal for all further development
in the area of federal transfers in its Goldlawr decision. This goal is
to remove "whatever obstacles may impede an expeditious and or-
derly adjudication of cases and controversies on their merits."15
When Congress enacted sections 1404(a) and 1406(a) a court
needed personal jurisdiction over the defendant in order to have the
power to transfer an action to another court. This view completely
eroded after the Goldlawr decision. Although jurisdiction and venue
remain prerequisites for a court to have the power to adjudicate a
suit, a court may transfer an action to a proper court if dismissing
the case would frustrate an adjudication on the merits.
If procedural simplification exists as an objective, the current
situation hinders the attainment of that goal. sections 1404(a) and
1406(a) are now outdated. The federal system requires a new stat-
ute, a."catch all" provision which would allow a court to dismiss or,
in the interests of justice, transfer a case when the court lacks per-
sonal jurisdiction or is an improper venue.
B. Text of Proposed "Catch All" Federal Transfer Statute
This comment proposes that Congress amend Title 28 of the
United States Code to add the following statute:
(a) A district court shall dismiss a case when it lacks jurisdiction
over the subject matter, personal jurisdiction over any defend-
ant, or when it is an incorrect venue.
(b) Nothing in subsection (a) shall prevent a district court from
transferring any case filed before it for the convenience of the
parties or witnesses to any other district or division where it
might have been brought if such a transfer would be in the in-
terests of justice.
(c) If a transfer is made under subsection (b), the case shall
proceed in the court to which it was transferred as if it had been
filed in that court on the date it was filed in the court which
ordered the transfer.
157. Goldlawr, Inc., v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466-67 (1962).
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C. Operation of the Proposed Statute
The law that the transferee court would use would remain the
same as provided by current case law. 15 8 This proposed statute
would replace sections 1404(a) and 1406(a) and section 1631 to the
extent that it allows a district court to transfer an action for want of
subject matter jurisdiction.
Further, it will accomplish the goals set by the Supreme Court
in its Goldlawr decision. First, it retains the idea that an action in-
correctly filed in a wrong court should be dismissed if the plaintiff
can refile in a proper court without prejudice to his rights. Second,
the proposed statute allows a court to transfer any case incorrectly
filed when such a transfer would be in the interest of justice. This
subsection of the statute will remove those obstacles which "may im-
pede an expeditious and orderly adjudication of cases and controver-
sies on their merits,"1" 9 by allowing any improper court to transfer a
case to a proper court. Thus, the proposed statute would avoid
"time-consuming and justice-defeating technicalities." ' 60 Finally, this
proposed statute will simplify and remove all the uncertainties for an
improper court when deciding how to transfer an action to a proper
court.
D. Application of the Proposed Statute
The application of the proposed "catch all" federal transfer
statute can be illustrated by considering the hypothetical suggested in
the introduction to this comment. 6 Briefly, we considered the plight
of a plaintiff who had been injured in an automobile collision with
defendant. The defendant resided in another state and defendant's
only contact with plaintiff's state was his trip there which resulted in
the accident. The plaintiff commenced an action in a federal district
court in his state.'62 This federal district court would be a proper
venue; personal jurisdiction, however, would be lacking.
If this were the situation, the district court would be faced with
a decision to dismiss the action or to transfer it to an appropriate
federal district court. If the plaintiff's rights would not suffer
158. For background on choice of law principles for federal transfers, see generally 15
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 9, § 3846.
159. Goldlawr, 369 U.S. at 466-67.
160. Id. at 467 (quoting Internatio-Rotterdam, Inc. v. Thomsen, 218 F.2d 514, 517 (4th
Cir. 1955)).
161. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
162. For general subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and venue require-
ments, see supra notes 2-5.
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prejudice by a dismissal, the court would dismiss the action pursuant
to subsection (a) of the proposed statute. If the statute of limitations
had run, however, the plaintiffs rights would be adversely affected
by a dismissal. If the court determines that a transfer would be in
the interests of justice, the court would transfer the case under sub-
section (b). Subsection (c) provides that in the transferee court, the
action would proceed as if it had been filed in that court on the date
it was filed in the court that ordered the transfer.
Thus, this statute would ensure that the interests of justice are
served by an appropriate dismissal or transfer. The court would have
a single, clear, and efficient statute to apply to such situations and
the interests of justice would not be hindered by time consuming
technicalities.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no dispute that a court has the power to transfer an
action when it lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant but venue
is proper. The difficulty is, as we have seen, how to effect such a
transfer.
A transfer using section 1404(a) calls for a broad reading of
this statute's language. Although such a transfer does not violate the
language of the statute, it is contrary to the statute's legislative in-
tent. The legislative history indicates that section 1404(a) is meant
to replace forum non conveniens which requires both personal juris-
diction and venue.
The application of section 1406(a) to such situations is more
difficult. Some courts read the language of the statute to allow, a
court to transfer an action when the court is a proper venue. The
language of the statute and legislative history clearly indicates, how-
ever, that a transfer under section 1406(a) is not permitted when
venue is properly laid in the court.
Section 1631 on its face could apply to such instances. On the
other hand, the legislative history of the statute and many courts in-
dicate that section 1631 only applies to subject matter jurisdiction.
Whether or not courts can utilize this provision to transfer an action
for want of personal jurisdiction is presently uncertain.
The most analytically sound method that now exists to transfer
a case when a court is a proper venue but lacks personal jurisdiction
is to use both statutes and apply a judicial gloss. This approach
eliminates the need to over read either section 1404(a) or sec-
tion 1406(a). Nevertheless, this method requires a court to base its
transfer not on any specific statutory authority but simply on an in-
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herent power of the court. Without specific statutory authority, dif-
ferent courts could use diverse standards and apply this judge-made
rule unequally.
To remedy such a situation, this comment proposes a new
"catch all" transfer statute. A new statute would eliminate the need
for a court to search for an appropriate basis to transfer an action
when it lacks personal jurisdiction but when venue is proper. So-that
all cases may be decided on their merits, and so that courts spend
less time on the technicalities of jurisdiction and venue, the proposed
statute would allow a district court which lacks subject matter or
personal jurisdiction, or a district court which is an improper venue,
to transfer any case filed before it to a proper court where that case
can be resolved on its merits.
Bradford Nilsson
